A reinforcement learning theory for homeostatic regulation

Reinforcement learning models address animal’s behavioral adaptation to its changing “external” environment, and are based on the assumption that Pavlovian, habitual and goal-directed responses seek to maximize reward acquisition. Negative-feedback models of homeostatic regulation, on the other hand, are concerned with behavioral adaptation in response to the “internal” state of the animal, and assume that animals’ behavioral objective is to minimize deviations of some key physiological variables from their hypothetical setpoints. Building upon the drive-reduction theory of reward, we propose a new analytical framework that integrates learning and regulatory systems, such that the two seemingly unrelated objectives of reward maximization and physiological-stability prove to be identi- cal. The proposed theory shows behavioral adaptation to both internal and external states in a disciplined way. We further show that the proposed framework allows for a unified explanation of some behavioral pattern like motivational sensitivity of different associative learning mechanism, anticipatory responses, interaction among competing motivational systems, and risk aversion

Optimizing the depth and the direction of prospective planning using information values

Evaluating the future consequences of actions is achievable by simulating a mental search tree into the future. Expanding deep trees, however, is computationally taxing. Therefore, machines and humans use a plan-until-habit scheme that simulates the environment up to a limited depth and then exploits habitual values as proxies for consequences that may arise in the future. Two outstanding questions in this scheme are “in which directions the search tree should be expanded?”, and “when should the expansion stop?”. Here we propose a principled solution to these questions based on a speed/accuracy tradeoff: deeper expansion in the appropriate directions leads to more accurate planning, but at the cost of slower decision-making. Our simulation results show how this algorithm expands the search tree effectively and efficiently in a grid-world environment. We further show that our algorithm can explain several behavioral patterns in animals and humans, namely the effect of time-pressure on the depth of planning, the effect of reward magnitudes on the direction of planning, and the gradual shift from goal-directed to habitual behavior over the course of training. The algorithm also provides several predictions testable in animal/human experiments

Midbrain Dopamine Neurons Signal Belief in Choice Accuracy during a Perceptual Decision

Central to the organization of behavior is the ability to predict the values of outcomes to guide choices. The accuracy of such predictions is honed by a teaching signal that indicates how incorrect a prediction was (“reward prediction error,” RPE). In several reinforcement learning contexts, such as Pavlovian conditioning and decisions guided by reward history, this RPE signal is provided by midbrain dopamine neurons. In many situations, however, the stimuli predictive of outcomes are perceptually ambiguous. Perceptual uncertainty is known to influence choices, but it has been unclear whether or how dopamine neurons factor it into their teaching signal. To cope with uncertainty, we extended a reinforcement learning model with a belief state about the perceptually ambiguous stimulus; this model generates an estimate of the probability of choice correctness, termed decision confidence. We show that dopamine responses in monkeys performing a perceptually ambiguous decision task comply with the model’s predictions. Consequently, dopamine responses did not simply reflect a stimulus’ average expected reward value but were predictive of the trial-to-trial fluctuations in perceptual accuracy. These confidence-dependent dopamine responses emerged prior to monkeys’ choice initiation, raising the possibility that dopamine impacts impending decisions, in addition to encoding a post-decision teaching signal. Finally, by manipulating reward size, we found that dopamine neurons reflect both the upcoming reward size and the confidence in achieving it. Together, our results show that dopamine responses convey teaching signals that are also appropriate for perceptual decisions

Cocaine Addiction as a Homeostatic Reinforcement Learning Disorder

Drug addiction implicates both reward learning and homeostatic regulation mechanisms of the brain. This has stimulated 2 partially successful theoretical perspectives on addiction. Many important aspects of addiction, however, remain to be explained within a single, unified framework that integrates the 2 mechanisms. Building upon a recently developed homeostatic reinforcement learning theory, the authors focus on a key transition stage of addiction that is well modeled in animals, escalation of drug use, and propose a computational theory of cocaine addiction where cocaine reinforces behavior due to its rapid homeostatic corrective effect, whereas its chronic use induces slow and long-lasting changes in homeostatic setpoint. Simulations show that our new theory accounts for key behavioral and neurobiological features of addiction, most notably, escalation of cocaine use, drug-primed craving and relapse, individual differences underlying dose-response curves, and dopamine D2-receptor downregulation in addicts. The theory also generates unique predictions about cocaine self-administration behavior in rats that are confirmed by new experimental results. Viewing addiction as a homeostatic reinforcement learning disorder coherently explains many behavioral and neurobiological aspects of the transition to cocaine addiction, and suggests a new perspective toward understanding addiction

Homeostatic reinforcement learning for integrating reward collection and physiological stability

Efficient regulation of internal homeostasis and defending it against perturbations requires adaptive behavioral strategies. However, the computational principles mediating the interaction between homeostatic and associative learning processes remain undefined. Here we use a definition of primary rewards, as outcomes fulfilling physiological needs, to build a normative theory showing how learning motivated behaviors may be modulated by internal states. Within this framework, we mathematically prove that seeking rewards is equivalent to the fundamental objective of physiological stability, defining the notion of physiological rationality of behavior. We further suggest a formal basis for temporal discounting of rewards by showing that discounting motivates animals to follow the shortest path in the space of physiological variables toward the desired setpoint. We also explain how animals learn to act predictively to preclude prospective homeostatic challenges, and several other behavioral patterns. Finally, we suggest a computational role for interaction between hypothalamus and the brain reward system

Flexibility to contingency changes distinguishes habitual and goal-directed strategies in humans

Decision-making in the real world presents the challenge of requiring flexible yet prompt behavior, a balance that has been characterized in terms of a trade-off between a slower, prospective goal-directed model-based (MB) strategy and a fast, retrospective habitual model-free (MF) strategy. Theory predicts that flexibility to changes in both reward values and transition contingencies can determine the relative influence of the two systems in reinforcement learning, but few studies have manipulated the latter. Therefore, we developed a novel two-level contingency change task in which transition contingencies between states change every few trials; MB and MF control predict different responses following these contingency changes, allowing their relative influence to be inferred. Additionally, we manipulated the rate of contingency changes in order to determine whether contingency change volatility would play a role in shifting subjects between a MB and MF strategy. We found that human subjects employed a hybrid MB/MF strategy on the task, corroborating the parallel contribution of MB and MF systems in reinforcement learning. Further, subjects did not remain at one level of MB/MF behaviour but rather displayed a shift towards more MB behavior over the first two blocks that was not attributable to the rate of contingency changes but rather to the extent of training. We demonstrate that flexibility to contingency changes can distinguish MB and MF strategies, with human subjects utilizing a hybrid strategy that shifts towards more MB behavior over blocks, consequently corresponding to a higher payoff

Improving the reliability of model-based decision-making estimates in the two-stage decision task with reaction-times and drift-diffusion modeling

A well-established notion in cognitive neuroscience proposes that multiple brain systems contribute to choice behaviour. These include: (1) a model-free system that uses values cached from the outcome history of alternative actions, and (2) a model-based system that considers action outcomes and the transition structure of the environment. The widespread use of this distinction, across a range of applications, renders it important to index their distinct influences with high reliability. Here we consider the two-stage task, widely considered as a gold standard measure for the contribution of model-based and model-free systems to human choice. We tested the internal/temporal stability of measures from this task, including those estimated via an established computational model, as well as an extended model using drift-diffusion. Drift-diffusion modeling suggested that both choice in the first stage, and RTs in the second stage, are directly affected by a model-based/free trade-off parameter. Both parameter recovery and the stability of model-based estimates were poor but improved substantially when both choice and RT were used (compared to choice only), and when more trials (than conventionally used in research practice) were included in our analysis. The findings have implications for interpretation of past and future studies based on the use of the two-stage task, as well as for characterising the contribution of model-based processes to choice behaviour

Stochastic satisficing account of confidence in uncertain value-based decisions

Every day we make choices under uncertainty; choosing what route to work or which queue in a supermarket to take, for example. It is unclear how outcome variance, e.g. uncertainty about waiting time in a queue, affects decisions and confidence when outcome is stochastic and continuous. How does one evaluate and choose between an option with unreliable but high expected reward, and an option with more certain but lower expected reward? Here we used an experimental design where two choices’ payoffs took continuous values, to examine the effect of outcome variance on decision and confidence. We found that our participants’ probability of choosing the good (high expected reward) option decreased when the good or the bad options’ payoffs were more variable. Their confidence ratings were affected by outcome variability, but only when choosing the good option. Unlike perceptual detection tasks, confidence ratings correlated only weakly with decisions’ time, but correlated with the consistency of trial-by-trial choices. Inspired by the satisficing heuristic, we propose a “stochastic satisficing” (SSAT) model for evaluating options with continuous uncertain outcomes. In this model, options are evaluated by their probability of exceeding an acceptability threshold, and confidence reports scale with the chosen option’s thus-defined satisficing probability. Participants’ decisions were best explained by an expected reward model, while the SSAT model provided the best prediction of decision confidence. We further tested and verified the predictions of this model in a second experiment. Our model and experimental results generalize the models of metacognition from perceptual detection tasks to continuous-value based decisions. Finally, we discuss how the stochastic satisficing account of decision confidence serves psychological and social purposes associated with the evaluation, communication and justification of decision-making

Adaptive integration of habits into depth-limited planning defines a habitual-goal–directed spectrum

Behavioral and neural evidence reveal a prospective goal-directed decision process that relies on mental simulation of the environment, and a retrospective habitual process that caches returns previously garnered from available choices. Artificial systems combine the two by simulating the environment up to some depth and then exploiting habitual values as proxies for consequences that may arise in the further future. Using a three-step task, we provide evidence that human subjects use such a normative plan-until-habit strategy, implying a spectrum of approaches that interpolates between habitual and goal-directed responding. We found that increasing time pressure led to shallower goal-directed planning, suggesting that a speed-accuracy tradeoff controls the depth of planning with deeper search leading to more accurate evaluation, at the cost of slower decision-making. We conclude that subjects integrate habit-based cached values directly into goal-directed evaluations in a normative manner